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Abstract
We prove that any proof of a ∀Σ02 sentence in the theory WKL0+RT
2
2
can be translated into a proof in RCA0 at the cost of a polynomial increase
in size. In fact, the proof in RCA0 can be found by a polynomial-time
algorithm. On the other hand, RT22 has non-elementary speedup over the
weaker base theory RCA∗0 for proofs of Σ1 sentences.
We also show that for n > 0, proofs of Πn+2 sentences in BΣn+1 + exp
can be translated into proofs in IΣn + exp at polynomial cost. Moreover,
the Πn+2-conservativity of BΣn+1 + exp over IΣn + exp can be proved in
PV, a fragment of bounded arithmetic corresponding to polynomial-time
computation. For n > 1, this answers a question of Clote, Ha´jek, and
Paris.
The logical strength of Ramsey’s theorem for pairs and two colours, RT22, has
been a major topic of interest in reverse mathematics and related areas of logic
for over 25 years [26, 4, 5, 6]. Recently, Patey and the third author [24] showed
that RT22 is ∀Σ
0
2-conservative over the usual base theory considered in reverse
mathematics, RCA0, which is axiomatized by recursive comprehension and Σ
0
1
induction. This new insight into the strength of RT22 naturally leads to some
further questions. One of these is, of course, whether the ∀Σ02-conservativity
over RCA0 extends to full Π
1
1-conservativity over RCA0 strengthened by the
1
Σ02 collection principle (Π
1
1-conservativity over RCA0 being out of the question,
as witnessed by Σ02 collection itself). Here, we consider a different problem,
already raised as Question 9.5 in [24]: does RT22 have significant proof speedup
over RCA0 with respect to ∀Σ02 sentences?
The study of proof size in axiomatic theories and proof speedup phenomena,
a topic going back to Go¨del [15], was given an excellent (if no longer fully
up-to-date) survey in [25]. An important phenomenon that has been observed
empirically is that, from a quantitative perspective, prominent cases in which an
arithmetic theory T+ is conservative over a theory T for sentences of some class
Γ typically fit one of two patterns. Either T+ has iterated exponential (“tower
function”) speedup over T on proofs of sentences from Γ, or each proof of such
a sentence in T+ can be translated into a proof in T with at most polynomial
blowup. The former behaviour is illustrated for instance by the conservativity
of arithmetical comprehension ACA0 over PA and the Π2 conservativity of IΣ1
over primitive recursive arithmetic. The latter, by the conservativity of RCA0
over IΣ1 and the Π
1
1-conservativity of Weak Ko˝nig’s Lemma over RCA0. The
question we are interested in is whether the conservativity result of [24] also fits
one of these patterns and, if so, which one.
Our main result is that RT22 has at most polynomial speedup over RCA0 for
∀Σ02 sentences. Moreover, this is witnessed by a polynomial simulation: there
is a polytime procedure that takes a proof of a ∀Σ02 sentence in WKL0 + RT
2
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(where WKL0 is RCA0 extended by Weak Ko˝nig’s Lemma) and outputs a proof
of the same sentence in RCA0. By [3, Proposition 4.6], it follows that proofs of
(purely first-order) Π3 sentences in WKL0+RT
2
2 can be translated in polynomial
time into proofs in IΣ1. To obtain our result, we make use of a general-purpose
technique due to Avigad [1]: in order to show polynomial simulation of a theory
T+ by T , build what could be called a “forcing interpretation” of T+ in T – that
is, formalize within T a forcing construction that leads to a model of T+ – and
verify via small proofs in T that sentences of the appropriate class are forced if
they are true in the ground model. Interestingly, however, while most forcing
arguments give rise to a generic extension of the ground model, the one we work
with produces a generic cut, refining an initial segment construction used in [24].
Both the construction of [24] and ours rely on non-trivial finite combinatorics.
In the case of [24], this took the form of upper bound on Ramsey’s theorem
for finite sets expressed in terms of so-called α-largeness. Here, we need a
considerable strengthening of that bound with a more constructive proof, which
was provided in [21].
We also consider the question whether an analogous polynomial simulation
result still holds if we weaken the base theory to RCA∗0, which differs from RCA0
in that the Σ01 induction scheme is replaced by ∆
0
0 induction (plus a separate
axiom exp guaranteeing totality of the exponential function). It turns out that,
perhaps surprisingly, changing the base theory makes a major difference: even
though RT22 is ∀Σ
0
2-conservative over RCA
∗
0 (as can be shown by the method
used to derive Π02-conservativity in [30]), it has iterated exponential speedup over
RCA∗0, already for relatively simple sentences. We give a detailed proof of the
speedup for Σ1 sentences; in fact, it can also be witnessed by finite consistency
statements, which can be written as bounded formulas with exponential terms.
Since RCA0 + RT
2
2 proves Σ
0
2 collection, our main theorem immediately
implies that the Paris-Friedman theorem, i.e. Πn+2-conservativity of BΣn+1 over
IΣn, can be strengthened to a polynomial simulation for n = 1. It makes sense
2
to ask whether this extends to other values of n, especially because a related
question – whether the conservativity can be proved in bounded arithmetic –
was asked by Clote et al. [8]. We prove that the answer to both questions is
positive for all n > 1, and that it is positive for n = 0 if both BΣ1 and I∆0 are
extended by exp. Our argument is based on turning one of the standard model-
theoretic proofs of Paris-Friedman into a forcing interpretation. As discussed
in slightly greater detail in Section 4, Fedor Pakhomov [private communication]
has independently devised a completely different approach that proves a more
general result; in particular, his argument obviates the need for exp in the n = 0
case.
The remainder of this paper has a relatively straightforward structure. After
introducing some basic definitions and notational conventions below, we discuss
the general concept of forcing interpretations in Section 1. We prove our main
theorem in Section 2 and the contrasting speedup result over RCA∗0 in Section
3. The polynomial simulation of BΣn+1 + exp by IΣn + exp is presented in
Section 4.
*
We assume that the reader has some basic knowledge of fragments of first-
and second-arithmetic as described in [27] or [18]. We will write L1 and L2
for the languages of first- and second-order arithmetic, respectively. Note that
these languages do not have a symbol for exponentiation. We use lowercase
letters for objects of the numerical (“first-order”) sort, and uppercase letters for
objects of the set (“second-order”) sort. Notation like Σ0n, Π
0
n represents the
usual formula classes defined in terms of first-order quantifier alternations, but
allowing second-order free variables. On the other hand, notation without the
superscript 0, like Σn, Πn, represents analogously defined classes of L1 formulas
– that is, without any second-order variables at all. If we want to specify the
second-order parameters appearing in a Σ0n formula, we use notation like Σn(X¯).
We extend these conventions to naming theories: thus, for example, BΣ02 is the
L2-theory axiomatized by ∆
0
0 induction and Σ
0
2 collection, whereas BΣ2 is the
L1-theory axiomatized by ∆0 induction and Σ2 collection.
Recall that RCA∗0 is the theory defined in [28] which differs from RCA0 in
that Σ01 induction is replaced by ∆
0
0 induction plus an axiom known as exp
which states the totality of exponentiation. The first-order consequences of
RCA∗0 coincide with the theory BΣ1 + exp, which in particular means that
RCA∗0 is Π2-conservative over I∆0 + exp.
The symbol N stands for the set of natural numbers – both as understood in
the metatheory (the standard natural numbers) or as formalized in an L2 or L1
theory (which, if consistent, will of course have nonstandard models). It should
be clear from the context which is meant. A set X ⊆ N is finite if it is bounded,
i.e. there is k ∈ N such that ℓ 6 k for all ℓ ∈ X ; otherwise, X is infinite. Each
finite set X is coded in a standard way by the binary representation of some
natural number x, and may be identified with x in many contexts. The symbol
ω stands for the smallest infinite ordinal – again, we use the same symbol in the
metatheory and in formal theories.
We will be interested in comparing the sizes of proofs of statements in various
theories, which requires us to fix some terminology and conventions regarding
syntax. We use the word theory to mean a set of sentences. Every theory T
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comes with a language L(T ) with the property that each non-logical symbol
appearing in T is in L(T ), though not necessarily vice versa. To simplify things,
we assume that L(T ) always contains only finitely many non-logical symbols.
The size of a term, a formula or a proof is the number of symbols in it. All
variable, constant, function and relation symbols count as one symbol. We use
vertical lines, | · |, to denote the size of a given syntactical object.
To measure the sizes of proofs precisely, one needs to fix a proof system. It
is known that there are polynomial-time translations between the usual Hilbert-
style systems and the sequent calculus with the cut rule [12], and between their
tree-like or sequence-like versions [25, Theorem 4.1]. Therefore, in principle, it
does not matter which proof system we choose here. In our arguments, we have
in mind a Hilbert-style system like the one in Enderton [14, Section 2.4], except
that instead of allowing all (universal closures of) propositional tautologies as
axioms, we derive them from a finite number of propositional axiom schemes.
We assume that, like in Enderton’s system, the only official connectives are ¬,→
and the only quantifier is ∀. Recall [14, page 113] that a term t is substitutable
for a variable symbol v in a formula ϕ if no free occurrence of v in ϕ is in the
scope of a quantifier binding a variable that appears in t.
Definition 0.1. Let T, T ′ be theories and let Γ be a set of sentences in the
language L(T ) ∩ L(T ′). Then T polynomially simulates T ′ with respect to Γ
if there exists a polynomial-time procedure that, given a proof of γ ∈ Γ in T ′
as input, outputs a proof of γ in T ′. (In particular, this implies that for every
proof of γ ∈ Γ′ in T ′, there is a proof of γ in T of at most polynomially larger
size.)
T ′ has non-elementary speedup over T with respect to Γ if for each elemen-
tary recursive function f , there exist γ ∈ Γ and a proof π of γ in T ′ such that
no proof of γ in T has size 6 f(|π|).
1 Forcing interpretations
The technique we use for proving polynomial simulations was developed in Avi-
gad [1] and relies on a certain kind of formalized forcing argument. In essence,
the idea is to define a more general notion of interpretation: while a traditional
interpretation gives a uniform way of defining a model M ′ |= T ′ inside a model
M |= T , an Avigad-style interpretation gives a way of describing a generic model
M [G] |= T ′ which is not fully specified until the generic filter G is fixed. The
point is that, even though no such G might be definable, the properties ofM [G]
that we care about in the context at hand do not depend on G.
In this section, we discuss this idea, and its connection to questions of proof
size, in some generality. We begin with an annoying technical issue.
1.1 Simplification
When defining intepretations, formulas with more than one function symbol in
an atomic subformula can cause ambiguities. In this subsection, we explain how
to get around the problem by avoiding such formulas as much as possible. This
is quite similar in spirit to translating all formulas to a relational language.
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Definition 1.1. A simple term is one of the form v or f(w¯), where v, w¯ are
variables. A simple formula is a formula in which every atomic subformula is
either
• a formula with no function symbol; or
• an equation with exactly one function symbol.
Definition 1.2. For a formula θ, its simple translation θ∗ is defined in the
following way.
First, for any given term t and some canonically chosen variable x not appear-
ing in t, we translate t into a formula t[x] by induction on the subterms of t. For a
variable y, the formula y[x] is x = y. For t of the form f(t1, . . . , tn), the formula
t[x] is ∀x1 . . . ∀xn (t1[x1]→ (t2[x2] → . . .→ (tn[xn]→ x = f(x1, . . . , xn)) . . .)).
The formula θ∗ equals θ for θ simple atomic. If θ is R(t1, . . . , tn) and is not
simple, then θ∗ is
∀x1 . . . ∀xn (t1[x1] → (t2[x2]→ . . .→ (tn[xn]→ R(x1, . . . , xn)) . . .))
for appropriately chosen variables x1, . . . , xn. The translation commutes with
¬, →, and ∀.
The following two lemmas mean that when studying questions of proof size,
we can can largely restrict attention to simple formulas. The lemmas can es-
sentially be read off Visser’s exposition in [29, Section 7.3].
Lemma 1.3. There exists a polynomial-time procedure that, given a formula
θ, outputs a first-order logic proof of θ ↔ θ∗.
Proof. This is essentially Theorem 7.3.6 in Visser [29], with the following dif-
ferences: (i) Visser defines the translation θ 7→ θ∗ (where θ∗ would be θ∗◦ in his
notation) using ∃ and ∧, while we use ∀ and → to match the official connectives
of our proof system, and (ii) Visser only needs a formal proof of θ ↔ θ∗ of size
polynomial in |θ|, so he does not discuss the time required to construct it. How-
ever, these differences have no bearing on the proof, and the reader can verify
that all of Visser’s constructions can be carried out in polynomial time.
Lemma 1.4. There is a polynomial-time procedure that, given a proof π in
first-order logic, outputs a proof π∗ with the following properties:
• π∗ is a proof in the same language as π;
• every formula in π∗ is simple;
• if θ1, θ2, . . . , θℓ are the non-logical axioms in π, then θ
∗
1 , θ
∗
2 , . . . , θ
∗
ℓ are the
non-logical axioms in π∗;
• if η is the conclusion of π, then η∗ is the conclusion of π∗.
Proof. See Theorem 7.3.3 and Theorem 7.3.4 in Visser [29], with the same
caveats as in Lemma 1.3.
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1.2 Forcing translations and interpretations
A traditionally understood interpretation of a theory T ′ in a theory T is essen-
tially (i) a translation of L(T ′) into L(T ) such that (ii) T proves the translations
of axioms of T ′. Forcing interpretations of the sort we need here have a similar
two-layered structure of “translation” and “interpretation proper”, except that
now instead of translating an L(T ′) formula ϕ into L(T ), we have to translate
“ϕ is forced” into L(T ). Then we have to verify in T that the axioms of T ′ are
forced.
Definition 1.5. A forcing translation τ from a language L′ to a language L
consists of L formulas
s ∈ Condτ , s
′
Pτ s, s τ v↓, s τ α(v1, v2, . . . , vℓ)
for every simple atomic L′ formula α(v1, v2, . . . , vℓ) such that
(FT1) s′ Pτ s contains s
′ ∈ Condτ ∧ s ∈ Condτ as a conjunct;
(FT2) s τ v↓ contains s ∈ Condτ as a conjunct;
(FT3) s τ α(v1, v2, . . . , vℓ) contains
∧∧ℓ
i=1 s τ vi↓ as a conjunct, whenever
α(v1, v2, . . . , vℓ) is a simple atomic L′ formula; and
(FT4) if α(u¯, v) is a simple atomic L′ formula and w is a variable, then(
s τ α(u¯, v)
)
[v/w] and s τ
(
α(u¯, v)[v/w]
)
are the same.
All formulas above have exactly the free variables shown. When there is no
risk of ambiguity, we will often omit the subscript τ in the notation. We read
‘s  . . . ’ as ‘s forces . . . ’. By convention, the variable symbols s, s′, s′′, . . . are
always distinct from u, v, w, z, . . . . In accordance with the usual terminological
customs related to forcing, we refer to elements s satisfying s ∈ Cond as forcing
conditions, and we think of the objects denoted by the variables u, v, . . . as
names (for the elements of the generic model being described).
Remark. In some contexts, it might make sense to allow forcing conditions to
be tuples of elements instead of single elements. However, in this paper we
deal exclusively with theories that have a definable pairing function, so to avoid
complicating the notation we eschew that kind of generality and continue to
write s rather than s¯.
The clauses we use to extend a forcing relation to arbitrary simple formulas
follow those of a “good strong forcing notion” in the sense Avigad [1, Defini-
tion 4.2]. We deal with non-simple formulas using the (·)∗ translation.
Definition 1.6. Let τ be a forcing translation from a language L′ to a lan-
guage L. We define an L formula s τ θ(v1, v2, . . . , vℓ) for each L′ formula
θ(v1, v2, . . . , vℓ) by recursion on θ as follows.
(FT5) If θ(v1, v2, . . . , vℓ) is a simple L′ formula, then
s τ ¬θ(v1, v2, . . . , vℓ)
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is defined to be
ℓ∧
i=1
“s τ vi↓” ∧ ∀s
′
Pτs s
′ 1τ θ(v¯).
(FT6) If θ(u1, u2, . . . , uk, w1, w2, . . . , wm) and η(v1, v2, . . . , vℓ, w1, w2, . . . , wm) are
simple L′ formulas, then
s τ θ(u1, u2, . . . , uk, w1, w2, . . . , wm)→ η(v1, v2, . . . , vℓ, w1, w2, . . . , wm)
is defined to be
k∧
i=1
“s τ ui↓” ∧
ℓ∧
i=1
“s τ vi↓” ∧
m∧
i=1
“s τ wi↓”
∧ ∀s′Pτs ∃s
′′
Pτs
′
(
“s′ τ θ(u¯, w¯)”→ “s
′′ τ η(v¯, w¯)”
)
.
(FT7) If θ(v1, v2, . . . , vℓ, w) is a simple L′ formula, then
s τ ∀w θ(v1, v2, . . . , vℓ, w)
is defined to be
ℓ∧
i=1
“s τ vi↓” ∧ ∀w ∀s
′
Pτs ∃s
′′
Pτs
′
(
“s′ τ w↓”→ “s
′′ τ θ(v¯, w)”
)
.
(FT8) If θ(v¯) is an L′ formula that is not simple, then s τ θ(v¯) is defined to be
s τ θ
∗(v¯), where θ∗(v¯) is the formula given by Lemma 1.3.
(FT9) ∧,∨,↔, ∃ are defined in terms of ¬,→, ∀ in the usual way.
Here the quotation marks “. . .” are simply another type of brackets to enhance
the readability of formulas. Our convention is that  has lower precedence than
all the logical connectives in first-order logic. All formulas above have exactly
the free variables shown. We often abbreviate
∧∧
i(s τ vi↓) as s τ v¯↓.
The definitions above are designed to make (FT3)Item.3 and (FT4)Item.4
hold for all formulas.
Lemma 1.7. Let τ be a forcing translation from a language L′ to a language L.
Then:
(i) s τ θ(v¯) contains s  v¯↓ as a conjunct for every L′ formula θ(v¯),
(ii) if θ(u¯, v) is a L′ formula and w is a variable, then(
s τ θ(u¯, v)
)
[v/w] and s τ
(
θ(u¯, v)[v/w]
)
are the same, and the variable w is substitutable for v in θ(u¯, v) exactly
when it is so in s τ θ(u¯, v).
Proof. Part (i) is true by construction. Part (ii), which is a special case of
Lemma 4.3 in Avigad [1], can be proved by an easy induction on θ using the
definitions. For non-simple formulas θ(u¯, v), we assume the simplification pro-
cedure employs a canonical choice of variables.
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Definition 1.8. A forcing interpretation of a theory T ′ in a theory T is a
forcing translation τ from L(T ′) to L(T ) such that T proves
(FI0) ∃s (s ∈ Condτ );
(FI1) ∀s∈Condτ s Pτ s;
(FI2) ∀s, s′, s′′∈Condτ
(
s′′ Pτ s
′ ∧ s′ Pτ s→ s′′ Pτ s
)
;
(FI3) ∀s∈Condτ ∃s′Pτs ∃v s′ τ v↓;
(FI4) ∀s, s′∈Condτ ∀v
(
s′ Pτ s ∧ “s τ v↓”→ “s′ τ v↓”
)
;
(FI5) for all simple atomic L(T ′) formulas α(v¯),
∀s, s′∈Condτ ∀v¯
(
s′ Pτ s ∧ “s τ α(v¯)”→ “s
′ τ α(v¯)”
)
;
(FI6) ∀s∈Condτ ∀v (“s τ v↓”→ “s τ v = v”);
(FI7) ∀s∈Condτ ∀u, v (“s τ u = v”→ “s τ v = u”);
(FI8) ∀s∈Condτ ∀u, v, w (“s τ u = v” ∧ “s τ v = w”→ “s τ u = w”);
(FI9) for all k ∈ N and all k-ary function symbols f in L(T ′),
∀s∈Condτ ∀v1, v2, . . . , vk
( k∧
i=1
“s τ vi↓”
→ ∀s′Ps ∃s′′Ps′ ∃w “s′′ τ w = f(v¯)”
∧ s τ ∀w,w
′
(
w = f(v¯)→ (w′ = f(v¯)→ w = w′)
))
;
(FI10) for all simple L(T ′) terms t(v1, v2, . . . , vk) with exactly the free variables
shown and all simple atomic L(T ′) formulas α(u¯, w0) such that α(u¯, t(v¯))
is simple,
∀s∈Condτ ∀u¯, v1, v2, . . . , vk, w(
“s τ w = t(v¯)”→ (“s τ α(u¯, w)”↔ “s τ α(u¯, t(v¯))”)
)
;
(FI11) ∀s∈Condτ ∀v (∀s′Pτs ∃s′′Pτs′ “s′′ τ v↓”→ s τ v↓);
(FI12) for all simple atomic L(T ′) formulas α(v¯),
∀s∈Condτ ∀v¯
(
∀s′Pτs ∃s
′′
Pτs
′ “s′′ τ α(v¯)”→ s τ α(v¯)
)
;
(FI13) ∀s∈Condτ s τ σ for all σ ∈ T ′.
We refer to a forcing translation satisfying (FI0)Item.12–(FI12)Item.24 (that is,
to a forcing interpretation of pure logic) as a forcing interpretation of L(T ′) in
T .
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Conditions (FI0)Item.12 and (FI3)Item.15 are technical. Conditions (FI1)Item.13–(FI2)Item.14
state that P is a preorder. On the other hand, we require neither antisymmetry
nor the existence of a maximal element. (FI4)Item.16–(FI5)Item.17 form the
base case of the usual requirement that forcing be closed downwards under P.
(FI6)Item.18–(FI10)Item.22 say roughly that equality axioms are forced. The
variable symbol w in (FI10)Item.22 may be syntactically equal to one of u¯,
but by convention w0 cannot be. (FI11)Item.23–(FI12)Item.24 express the base
case of the connection between forcing ¬¬ϕ and forcing ϕ. Finally, the crucial
condition (FI13)Item.25 is what makes a forcing interpretation of pure logic be
an interpretation of a theory T ′: all axioms of T ′ are forced.
Forcing interpretations are clearly closed under composition and definition
by cases. As shown by the following example, our notion of forcing interpreta-
tions generalizes the usual notion of interpretation.
Example 1.9. Every interpretation (more precisely, every parameter-free one-
dimensional global relative interpretation) τ of a theory T ′ in a theory T gives
rise to a forcing interpretation of T ′ in T as follows.
• Define s ∈ Condτ and s′ Pτ s to be respectively
s = s and s′ = s′ ∧ s = s.
• Define s τ v↓ to be s ∈ Condτ ∧ δ(v), where δ(v) is the defining formula
for the domain of τ .
• Define s τ α(v¯), where α(v¯) is a simple atomic L(T ′) formula, according
to the interpretation τ .
1.3 Forcing interpretations and polynomial simulation
We now turn to the question of what is required of a forcing interpretation if it
is to imply a polynomial simulation between theories.
We begin by verifying that proofs of some basic facts, including generaliza-
tions of (FI5)Item.17, (FI10)Item.22, and (FI12)Item.24 to all formulas, can be
found in polynomial time for any forcing interpretation. Recall our convention
that the language of a theory is always finite, which is implicitly used in the
proofs of the lemmas below.
Lemma 1.10. Let τ be a forcing interpretation of a theory T ′ in a theory T .
Then there is a polynomial-time procedure which, given a L(T ′) formula θ(v¯),
outputs a proof in T of
∀s∈Condτ ∀v¯ ¬
(
“s τ θ(v¯)” ∧ “s τ ¬θ(v¯)”
)
.
Proof. Apply (FT5)Item.5.
Lemma 1.11. Let τ be a forcing interpretation of a theory T ′ in a theory T .
Then there is a polynomial-time procedure which, given a L(T ′) formula θ(v¯),
outputs proofs in T of:
(1) ∀s, s′∈Condτ ∀v¯
(
s′ Pτ s ∧ “s τ θ(v¯)”→ “s′ τ θ(v¯)”
)
; and
(2) ∀s∈Condτ ∀v¯
(
∀s′Pτs ∃s′′Pτs′ “s′′ τ θ(v¯)”→ s τ θ(v¯)
)
.
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Proof. These are part of Lemma 4.3 and Lemma 4.6 in Avigad [1], except that
we additionally need to pay attention to the computational complexity of the
proof constructions. The proofs are built using induction on the structure of
θ, with the inductive step split into cases depending on the outermost logical
connective in θ. In each case, the construction is straightforward.
Lemma 1.12. Let τ be a forcing interpretation of a theory T ′ in a theory T .
There is a polynomial-time procedure which – given a L(T ′) term t(v¯) with
exactly the free variables shown and a simple L(T ′) formula θ(u¯, w0) such that
θ(u¯, t(v¯)) is also simple, and both w and t(v¯) are substitutable for w0 in θ(u¯, w0)
– outputs a proof in T of:
∀s∈Condτ ∀u¯, v¯, w
(
“s τ w = t(v¯)”→ (“s τ θ(u¯, w)”↔ “s τ θ(u¯, t(v¯))”)
)
.
Proof. This is part of Lemma 4.3 in Avigad [1], again with attention paid to
the computational complexity of the construction. As previously, one proceeds
by induction on the structure of θ.
Definition 1.13. A forcing interpretation τ of a theory T ′ in a theory T is
polynomial if there is polynomial-time procedure which, given any σ ∈ T ′,
outputs a proof in T of the statement ∀s∈Condτ s τ σ.
Note that if T ′ is finitely axiomatized, then any forcing interpretation of T ′
is automatically a polynomial forcing interpretation.
Proposition 1.14. Let τ be a forcing interpretation of a theory T ′ in a the-
ory T . For all L(T ′) formulas ϕ(v¯), ψ(v¯), if T ′ + ϕ(v¯) ⊢ ψ(v¯), then T proves
∀s∈Condτ ∀v¯
(
s τ ϕ(v¯)→ s τ ψ(v¯)
)
. (1)
If τ is polynomial, then a proof of (1) in T ′ can be found in polynomial time
given ϕ, ψ, and a proof π of ψ(v¯) from T ′ + ϕ(v¯).
Proof. Let π∗ be the proof obtained from π according to Lemma 1.4. By
(FT8)Item.8 and (FI13)Item.25, for each non-logical axiom γ used in π∗ we
can find a proof in T of ∀s∈Cond (s  ϕ(v¯) → s  γ). If τ is a polynomial
forcing intepretation of T ′ in T , these proofs can be found in polynomial time.
We then construct analogous proofs for each line γ in π∗, by a routine induc-
tion on the structure of π∗; cf. Proposition 4.8 in Avigad [1]. By (FT8)Item.8,
in the case of the last line this is a proof of ∀s∈Cond (s  ϕ(v¯)→ s  ψ(v¯)).
We note the following important special case of Proposition 1.14.
Corollary 1.15. Let τ be a forcing interpretation of T ′ in T . Then for each
L(T ′) sentence σ, if T ′ proves σ, then T proves ∀s∈Condτ (s τ σ). Moreover,
if τ is polynomial, then a proof of ∀s∈Condτ (s τ σ) in T can be found in
polynomial time given a proof of σ in T ′.
Definition 1.16. Let T, T ′ be theories and Γ be a set of sentences in the
language L(T ) ∩ L(T ′). A forcing interpretation τ of T ′ in T is said to be
Γ-reflecting if, for all γ ∈ Γ, T proves
∀s∈Condτ (s τ γ)→ γ. (2)
The interpretation is polynomially Γ-reflecting if a T -proof of (2) can be found
in polynomial time on input γ ∈ Γ.
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Theorem 1.17 (essentially Avigad [1, Section 10]). Let T, T ′ be theories and
Γ be a set of sentences in the language L(T ) ∩ L(T ′). If there is a Γ-reflecting
forcing interpretation τ of T ′ in T , then T ′ is Γ-conservative over T . Moreover,
if such τ is polynomial and polynomially Γ-reflecting, then T polynomially sim-
ulates T ′ with respect to Γ.
Proof. Combine (FI0)Item.12, Corollary 1.15, and Definition 1.16.
2 Ramsey for pairs: polynomial simulation in
RCA0
In this section, we prove the main theorem of our paper.
Theorem 2.1. RCA0 polynomially simulates WKL0+RT
2
2 with respect to ∀Σ
0
2
sentences.
This is a strengthening of the main result of [24] that WKL0 +RT
2
2 is ∀Σ
0
2-
conservative over IΣ01. Since RCA0 is polynomially simulated by IΣ1 w.r.t. L1
sentences (see [19, 3] or consider the obvious interpretation of RCA0 in IΣ1 and
refer to Section 1), Theorem 2.1 has the following immediate corollary.
Corollary 2.2. IΣ1 polynomially simulates WKL0 + RT
2
2 with respect to Π3
sentences.
Our proof of Theorem 2.1 requires a stronger and more explicit version of a
result in finite combinatorics used to prove the conservativity theorem of [24].
The combinatorial statement is formulated using the concept of α-largeness
(originally introduced in [20] as a tool to study the unprovability of the Paris–
Harrington theorem), which provides a framework for measuring the size of finite
subsets of N by means of countable ordinals rather than just natural numbers.
We now recall some basic notions related to that framework.
For a given α < ωω and m ∈ N, define 0[m] = 0, α[m] = β if α = β +1, and
α[m] = β + ωn−1 ·m if α = β + ωn for some n > 1.
Definition 2.3 (I∆0 + exp). Let α < ω
ω. A set X = {x0 < · · · < xℓ−1} ⊆fin N
is said to be α-large if α[x0] . . . [xℓ−1] = 0. In other words, any finite set is
0-large, and X is α-large when
• X \ {minX} is β-large if α = β + 1,
• X \ {minX} is (β + ωn−1 ·minX)-large if α = β + ωn for n > 1.
The proposition below lists some well-known and simple but important prop-
erties of α-largeness. Their provability in I∆0+exp was pointed out e.g. in [21].
Proposition 2.4. The following are provable in I∆0 + exp:
(i) If a set X is α-large and X ⊆ Y ⊆fin N, then Y is α-large.
(ii) If α = ωnk + · · ·+ωn0 where nk > · · · > n0, then a set X is α-large if and
only if there exist sets X0, . . . , Xk such that X = X0 ⊔ · · · ⊔Xk, each Xi
is ωni-large, and for each i < k, maxXi < minXi+1.
As a result, if X is ωn-large and k = minX , then X\{k} = X0⊔· · ·⊔Xk−1
where each Xi is ω
n−1-large, and for each i < k − 1, maxXi < minXi+1.
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(iii) If X is ωn · 2-large and X = X0 ∪ X1, then at least one of X0, X1 is
ωn-large.
The following result is crucial in the proof of the main theorem of [24].
Proposition 2.5. [24, Proposition 7.7] For every natural number n there exists
a natural numberm such that IΣ1 proves: for every X ⊆fin N with minX > 3, if
X is ωm-large, then every colouring f : [X ]2 → 2 has an ωn-large homogeneous
set.
As the analysis in the remainder of this section will reveal, proving Theorem
2.1 involves obtaining an upper bound on m in terms of n. The statement of
Proposition 2.5 gives no such upper bound, and any bound that could be derived
from a simple-minded analysis of the proof in [24] would be very weak — cer-
tainly not even elementary recursive. On the other hand, proving Theorem 2.1
requires a bound significantly better than exponential. We will use the bound
obtained in [21]:
Theorem 2.6. [21, Theorem 1.6] Provably in IΣ1, if X ⊆fin N is ω300x-large,
then every colouring f : [X ]2 → 2 has an ωx-large homogeneous set.
Remark. Note that in [21], the theorem includes the additional assumption that
minX > 3. However, using the proof presented in [21] and some very straight-
forward combinatorics of α-large sets, it is easy to verify that the assumption
is in fact unnecessary. To avoid annoying technicalities, we nevertheless assume
that any set X mentioned in the context of α-largeness satisfies minX > 1.
Our proof of Theorem 2.1 will involve an argument by cases, in which the
case distinction is based on how much induction is available. We introduce an
auxiliary theory, originally motivated by the case in which a certain amount
of induction fails, which turns out to be useful in the other case as well. The
theories and polynomial simulation relationships we consider in the proof are
summarized in Figure 1.
Definition 2.7. RCA0+I is a theory in the language of second-order arithmetic
extended by a new unary predicate I over the first-order sort.
The axioms of RCA0 + I are those of RCA0 plus the following statements:
(I1) I is a nonempty proper cut in the first-order universe,
(I2) I is closed under addition,
(I3) for every infinite set S, there exists finite X ⊆ S which is ωx-large for
some x > I.
For our purposes, the most important property of the theory RCA0 + I will
be that it polynomially simulates WKL0 + RT
2
2 with respect to proofs of ∀Σ
0
2
sentences. Before proving that fact, which is Lemma 2.10 below, we verify some
more basic properties of RCA0 + I.
Lemma 2.8. RCA0+(I1) polynomially simulates RCA0+ I with respect to L2
sentences.
12
IΣ1
RCA0
RCA0 + IΣ
0
2 RCA0 + ¬IΣ
0
2
RCA0 + (I1)
RCA0 + I
WKL0 +RT
2
2
L1
∀Σ03 L2
L2
∀Σ02
Figure 1: Polynomial simulations between the various theories in Section 2
Proof. It is enough to show that there is an interpretation of RCA0 + I in
RCA0 + (I1) that is the identity interpretation with respect to all symbols of
L2.
So, let J consist of those numbers x for which every infinite set contains an
ωx-large finite subset; this is easily seen to be a definable cut in RCA0.
Thus, I ∩ J is, provably in RCA0 + (I1), a proper definable cut with the
property that every infinite set contains an ωx-large subset for each x ∈ I∩J. It
follows that every infinite set X actually contains an ωx-large subset for some
x > I ∩ J, because the formula “X contains an ωx-large subset” is Σ01, so by
IΣ01 it cannot define exactly the cut I∩ J. Let K be a cut closed under addition
obtained from I∩J by applying Solovay’s technique of shortening cuts: in other
words, put K = {a ∈ I∩ J : ∀x ∈ I∩ J(a+x ∈ I∩ J)}. Then RCA0+(I1) proves
the axioms of RCA0 + I with K substituted for I.
Lemma 2.9. RCA0 + (I1) is polynomially simulated by:
(a) RCA0 + IΣ
0
2 with respect to ∀Σ
0
3 sentences,
(b) RCA0 + ¬IΣ02 with respect to L2 sentences.
Proof. The proof of (b) is essentially immediate: by interpreting I as the inter-
section of all Σ02-definable cuts, which is a definable proper cut in RCA0+¬IΣ
0
2,
we obtain an interpretation of RCA0+(I1) in RCA0+¬IΣ02 that is the identity
with respect to L2.
In the case of (a), let us first explain the underlying model-theoretic argu-
ment, which shows how to construct a model of RCA0 + (I1) from a model of
RCA0 + IΣ
0
2 while preserving the truth of a fixed ∃Π
0
3 sentence. We then give
some hints as to how this is reflected on the syntactic level.
Let (M,X ) |= RCA0+IΣ02+∃X δ(X), where δ ∈ Σ
0
4. Take A ∈ X such that
(M,X ) |= δ(A). From Beklemishev [2, Theorem 5.1], we know that IΣ2 proves
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the uniform Π4 reflection principle for IΣ1. A relativization of this implies
(M,X ) |= Con(IΣ01 + δ(P )), where P is a new predicate. An application of
the Low Arithmetized Completeness Theorem [17, Theorem I.4.27] then gives
an end-extension M ′ )e M and A
′ ⊆ M ′ such that (M ′, A′) |= IΣ01 + δ(P ).
Thus (M ′,∆1(P )-Def(M
′, A′),M) |= RCA0 + (I1) + ∃X δ(X). Moreover, the
universe and operations in (M ′, A′) are definable in M , as is the range of a
bijection between M and an initial segment of M ′ closed under +M
′
.
Crucially, the formulas used to define (M ′, A′) are not only independent
of M |= Con(IΣ01 + δ(P )), but they are also polynomial-time uniform in δ, in
the sense that they can be constructed in polynomial time given δ as input.
(Each of the formulas arises essentially by substituting the Go¨del number of
∃X δ(X) into a Σ2 formula γ(x) describing a low branch of a binary tree that
is ∆1-definable with first-order parameter x and is infinite as long as x is the
Go¨del number of a sentence consistent with IΣ01.) So, if π is a proof of ⊥
from RCA0 + (I1) + ∃X δ(X), we can build a proof of ⊥ from IΣ2(P ) + δ(P )
by taking π∗ and “relativizing it to (M ′,∆1(P )-Def(M
′, P ),M)”. That is, we
relativize first-order quantifiers to the formula defining the universe of M ′ and
replace first-order atoms by the formulas defining operations in M ′; replace
second-order quantifiers by quantification over pairs of a Σ1(P ) formula and an
equivalent Π1(P ) formula, changing atoms x ∈ X (for X different from P ) into
appropriate instances of the Σ1(P )-universal formula; replace I by the formula
defining the range of the inclusion M →֒ M ′. Additionally, it is necessary to
add polynomially many new proof lines in order to derive the translated axioms
of RCA0 + (I1) + ∃X δ(X) from IΣ2(P ) + δ(P ), and to deriving translations of
conclusions from translations of premises for each inference in π∗. The details
of the latter task are quite standard and somewhat similar to those in the proof
that IΣ1 polynomially simulates RCA0 based on the usual interpretation of
RCA0 in IΣ1, as described in e.g. [19, Chapter 3].
Lemma 2.10. RCA0 + I polynomially simulates WKL0 +RT
2
2 with respect to
∀Σ02 sentences.
To prove Lemma 2.10, we now define a particular forcing notion in RCA0+I.
We will then use a series of lemmas to show that this provides a polynomial
forcing interpretation of WKL0 +RT
2
2 in the sense of Section 1 and, moreover,
that the forcing interpretation is polynomially ∀Σ02-reflecting in the sense of
Definition 1.16.
Definition 2.11. We let a finite set s be a forcing condition (s ∈ Cond) if and
only if s is ωx-large for some x > I. The relation P is defined simply as ⊆. Note
that there is no P-largest condition.
There are two sorts of names, a first- and a second-order sort. A name of
the first-order sort is simply a natural number. A name of the second-sort is
also simply a natural number, this time viewed as coding a finite set according
to the Ackermann interpretation. (Formally, one may think of the first-order
names being 〈0, v〉 and second-order names being 〈1, v〉 for various numbers v.)
To avoid notational confusion, we will write v for the first-order and V for the
second-order names.
We say that s  v↓ if s∩ [1, v] is not a condition, that is, if it is not ωx-large
for any x > I. On the other hand, s  V ↓ holds always.
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For each simple atomic formula ϕ(v¯), we define s  ϕ to be (s  v¯↓)∧ϕ(v¯).
(In the special case of the simple atomic formula v ∈ V , this would be more
precisely stated as (s  v↓ ∧ s  V ↓) ∧ v ∈Ack V , where ∈Ack is the standard
Ackermann interpretation of ∈ in arithmetic. We shall ignore this detail from
now on.)
Before showing that this forcing notion provides a polynomial forcing inter-
pretation of WKL0+RT
2
2, we first discuss the model-theoretic intuition behind
it. Let (M,X , I) be a countable model of RCA0+I. The set of forcing conditions
Cond and the relationP of Definition 2.11 are both definable in (M,X , I). Take
an (M,X , I)-generic filter G of (Cond,P), and put IG = supM{min s : s ∈ G}.
One may then check that (IG,Cod(M/IG)) |= WKL0 + RT
2
2 by simulating the
inductive construction of a cut in the proof of [21, Theorem 3.3], where various
choices made in the inductive steps are now replaced by the genericity of G.
One may also check that for any v ∈M , v ∈ IG if and only if s ∩ [1, v] /∈ Cond
for some s ∈ G, and that s ∩ IG is cofinal in IG for any s ∈ G.
Thus, in Definition 2.11, s  v↓ is intended to hold only if s ∈ G guarantees
that v will be in IG. On the other hand, the name V is intended to refer to
V ∩ IG, which will always exist. The structure of +, ·,6 on IG is inherited
from the ground model, which motivates the trivial definition of forcing atomic
formulas.
Remark. By Proposition 2.4(iii), whenever an ωx-large set is split into two
subsets, one of them is ωx−1-large. As a consequence, if s  v↓, then s \ [1, v] is
a condition.
Lemma 2.12. The set of conditions Cond and the relations P,  of Definition
2.11 determine a forcing interpretation of L2 in the theory RCA0 + I.
Proof. Checking that Cond, P,  determine a forcing translation from L2 into
L2∪{I} is unproblematic, clause (FI13)Item.25 of the definition of forcing inter-
pretation trivializes, and most of the other clauses are also very easy to verify
in RCA0 + I. We discuss (FI9)Item.21 and (FI11)Item.23, which are perhaps
less obvious than the rest.
To verify (FI9)Item.21, note that if the set (x, y] is ω-large, then y > 2x,
and if it is ω2-large, then y > x2x > x2. Assume that s is ωx-large for some
x > I and that s  v↓, s  w↓ with say v 6 w. Since s∩ [1, w] is not a condition
and neither is s ∩ (w,w2] (being a subset of the set (w,w2], which is not even
ω2-large), it follows from Proposition 2.4(iii) that s ∩ [1, w2] is not a condition.
Thus, s  (w2)↓ and a fortiori s forces both (v + w)↓ and (vw)↓. This proves
the “existence” part of (FI9)Item.21. The “uniqueness” part follows easily from
(FT7)Item.7, (FT6)Item.6, and the definition of .
To show (FI11)Item.23, assume s 1 v↓. Then s′ := s ∩ [1, v] is a condition
with s′ P s. However, for any condition s′′ P s′, we have s′′ ∩ [1, v] = s′′, so
certainly s′′ 1 v↓.
We can use the proof of Lemma 2.12 to show that, actually, a slightly stronger
version of (FI9)Item.21 holds.
Lemma 2.13. There is a polynomial-time procedure which, given a term t(v¯),
outputs an RCA0+ I proof of the statement that, for any condition s, if s  v¯↓,
then s  t↓.
15
Proof. Using a standard argument, we can prove in RCA0 that t < (max v¯)
n,
for some n ∈ ω which is bounded by the number of symbols in t. By the proof
of Lemma 2.12, we can also prove in RCA0 + I that for any s and w, if s  w↓,
then s  (w2)↓. Iterating this reasoning logn times, we prove that if s  w↓,
then s  (wn)↓. We apply this to w := max v¯ in order to deduce s  (max v¯)n↓
and hence s  t↓.
Lemma 2.14. There is a polynomial-time procedure which, given a ∆0 formula
θ(v¯, V¯ ), outputs an RCA0 + I proof of
∀s ∀v¯ ∀V¯ [s  v¯↓ → (θ(v¯, V¯ )↔ (s  θ(v¯, V¯ )))].
Proof. The construction of the proof proceeds by induction on the structure of
θ. As the reader will be able to check, it can be carried out in polynomial-time.
We give an informal description of how the proof is built for the atomic step
and for each case of the inductive step.
Suppose θ is atomic. If θ is a simple formula, then the equivalence between
θ and s  θ follows immediately from the definition of our forcing relation.
Otherwise, if θ is say t1(v¯) 6 t2(v¯) (the other cases are similar or easier), then
θ∗ is defined to be
∀x1 ∀x2 (t1[x1]→ (t2[x2]→ x1 6 x2)),
(cf. Definition 1.2) and by (FT8)Item.8 we have to prove that a condition forces
θ∗ exactly if it forces v¯↓ and θ in fact holds. To achieve this, one first shows by
induction on subterms t′(u¯) of t1 and t2 (where u¯ is a subtuple of v¯) that, for
the appropriate variable x′ and any s ∈ Cond,
s  t′[x′] iff (s  u¯↓ ∧ x′ = t(u¯)). (3)
The inductive step is proved using (FT7)Item.7, (FT6)Item.6, the definition of
, and Lemma 2.13. Once (3) is proved for t′ equal to t1 and t2, one can prove
the equivalence of s  θ∗ with (s  v¯↓ ∧ t1 6 t2) by one more series of appeals
to (FT7)Item.7, (FT6)Item.6, the definition of , and Lemma 2.13.
Suppose θ is ¬η. The inductive assumption gives us a proof that whenever
s  v¯↓, then s  η(v¯, V¯ ) is equivalent to η(v¯, V¯ ). This equivalence generalizes
to all s′ P s, since for each such s′ we have s′  v¯↓ as well.
So, let s  v¯↓. Assuming ¬η, we have s′ 1 η for any s′ P s, and thus s  ¬η.
On the other hand, if s  ¬η, then by the definition of forcing s 1 η and hence
¬η.
Suppose θ is η(v¯, V¯ ) → ξ(v¯, V¯ ). The inductive assumption gives us a proof
that whenever s  v¯↓ and s′ P s, then s  η(v¯, V¯ ) is equivalent to η(v¯, V¯ ) and
likewise for ξ.
Let s  v¯↓. Assume η → ξ. If s′ P s forces η, then η holds and by our
assumption so does ξ, which implies s′  ξ. This shows s  η → ξ. Conversely,
assume η ∧ ¬ξ. Then s  η but for each s′ P s we have s′ 1 ξ. So, s 1 η → ξ.
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Suppose θ(v¯, V¯ ) is ∀w6t η(w, v¯, V¯ ). Recall that ∀w6t . . . is shorthand for
∀w (w 6 t→ . . .). (Here t = t(v¯) is a term in the variables v¯.) The atomic step
and the inductive assumption, respectively, give us proofs that if s  v¯↓ and
s  w↓, then
s  w 6 t is equivalent to w 6 t,
s  η(w, . . .) is equivalent to η(w, . . .).
As in the previous cases, the equivalences generalize to all s′ P s.
Moreover, by Lemma 2.13, we have a polynomial-time constructible proof
that if s  v¯↓, then s′ P s implies s′  t(v¯)↓ and thus s′  w↓ for any w 6 t(v¯).
Let s  v¯↓ and assume ∀w6t η(w, . . .). Take s′ P s and w such that s′  w↓
and s′  w 6 t. Then the atomic step gives w 6 t, which, by our assumption,
implies η(w, . . .). Thus s′  η(w, . . .), which is what we want.
Conversely, assume w 6 t is such that ¬η(w, . . .). Then s  w 6 t. Also, for
each s′ P s we have s′  w↓, so s′ 1 η(w, . . .). Thus, s 1 ∀w6t η(w, . . .).
Lemma 2.15. The relations Cond, P,  of Definition 2.11 determine a poly-
nomial forcing interpretation of WKL0 +RT
2
2 in RCA0 + I.
Proof. We have already shown in Lemma 2.12 that Cond, P,  determine a
forcing interpretation of L2 in RCA0 + I. So if we want to argue that this
is actually a forcing interpretation of WKL0 + RT
2
2, we only have to check
(FI13)Item.25. In other words, we must show that any condition s forces each
of the axioms of WKL0 + RT
2
2. This is immediate for the axiomatization of
non-negative parts of discrete ordered rings, so it remains to deal with ∆01-
comprehension, Σ01-induction, Weak Ko¨nig’s Lemma, and RT
2
2.
We reason in RCA0 + I, sometimes making tacit use of the following simple
observation: for any condition s and any k, a condition s′ ⊆ s with s′  k↓
exists exactly if s \ [1, k] is a condition.
We first deal with the Σ01-separation scheme, which implies both ∆
0
1-com-
prehension and Weak Ko¨nig’s Lemma. Consider a Σ01-separation axiom:
∀V¯ ∀v¯ [∀k (σ1(k, v¯, V¯ )→ ¬σ2(k, v¯, V¯ ))
→ ∃W ∀k ((σ1(k, v¯, V¯ )→ k ∈W ) ∧ (k ∈W → ¬σ2(k, v¯, V¯ )))],
where σ1 := ∃ℓ η1(ℓ, k, . . .) and σ2 := ∃ℓ η2(ℓ, k, . . .) are Σ01. Let s be a condition
and assume that s forces V¯ ↓, v¯↓ and that
s  ∀k (σ1(k, v¯, V¯ )→ ¬σ2(k, v¯, V¯ )). (4)
By the definition of forcing and Lemma 2.14, (4) implies the following: for every
k, ℓ1 6 max s such that s \ [1,max(k, ℓ1)] is a condition, if η1(ℓ1, k, . . .) holds,
then there is no ℓ2 6 max s such that η2(ℓ2, k, . . .) and s \ [1, ℓ2] is a condition.
In particular, it cannot be the case that ℓ1 > ℓ2. Thus, taking
W0 := {k 6 max s : ∃ℓ16max s (η1(ℓ1, k, . . .) ∧ ∀ℓ2<ℓ1 ¬η2(ℓ2, k, . . .))},
we conclude that s  ∀k ((σ1(k, . . .)→ k ∈W0) ∧ (k ∈ W0 → ¬σ2(k, . . .))).
We now turn to Σ01-induction. Consider the induction axiom for the Σ
0
1
formula σ := ∃ℓ η(ℓ, k, v¯, V¯ ) with respect to the variable k. Let s be a condition
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forcing v¯↓, V¯ ↓ and let j be such that s\[1, j] is a condition. Letm = min(s\[1, j])
and let x > I be such that s \ [1, j] is ωx-large. It follows that s \ [1,m] is
ωx−1m-large, which by Proposition 2.4((ii)) means that we can write s \ [1,m]
as a disjoint union
s \ [1,m] = s0 ⊔ · · · ⊔ sm−1,
where each set si is ω
x−1-large (in particular, it is a condition) and, for each
i < m− 1, max si < min si+1. Define:
W0 := {ℓ : ∃k<j (η(ℓ, k, . . .) ∧ ∀ℓ
′<ℓ¬η(ℓ′, k, . . .))}.
Since W0 has at most j elements and j < m, the finite pigeonhole principle
implies that W0 ∩ [min si0 ,max si0 ] = ∅ for some i0 < m. Note that for every
k < j we have
∃ℓ<min si0 η(ℓ, k, . . .) iff ∃ℓ6max si0 η(ℓ, k, . . .). (5)
By bounded induction on k, either ¬∃ℓ6max si0 η(ℓ, 0, . . .) or there is a maximal
k < j such that ∃ℓ6max si0 η(ℓ, k, . . .). By the property of si0 stated in (5),
it follows that si0 forces one of the three statements ¬σ(0, . . .), σ(j−1, . . .), or
∃k < j−1 (σ(k, . . .) ∧ ¬σ(k+1, . . .)). In each case, the existence of si0 implies
that s forces induction for σ below j.
Finally, we deal with RT22. Assume that s is a condition such that s  f↓
and s  f : [N]2 → 2. This means that f is defined on each pair 〈i, j〉 such
that i < j < max s and s \ [1, j] is a condition. Writing s = s0 ⊔ s1 where
max s0 < min s1 and s0, s1 are both conditions, we can conclude that f is
defined on all arguments below max s0.
Let x > I be such that s0 is ω
x-large. By Theorem 2.6, there exists an
ωx/300-large set s′ ⊆ s0 which is homogeneous w.r.t f . By (I2), I is closed under
addition, so x/300 > I, and hence s′ is a forcing condition.
It is easily verified that s′ forces “s′ is homogeneous w.r.t f”. However, we
also have:
s′  ∀k ∃ℓ (ℓ > k ∧ ℓ ∈ s′).
To see this, take a condition s′′ ⊆ s′ and k such that s′′  k↓. Then s′′ \ [1, k] is
a condition, and so is s′′ \ [1, ℓ] for ℓ := min(s′′ \ [1, k]). However, s′′ \ [1, ℓ]  ℓ↓,
and since ℓ > k ∧ ℓ ∈ s′ is a true ∆0 statement, Lemma 2.14 implies that it is
forced by s′′ \ [1, ℓ] as well.
This completes the proof that Cond,P, give a forcing interpretation of
WKL0 + RT
2
2 in RCA0 + I. Polynomiality of the interpretation is immediate
if we assume that WKL0 + RT
2
2 is finitely axiomatized. We may make this
assumption w.l.o.g. because both WKL and RT22 are single axioms, while RCA0
can be axiomatized by using a finite number of instances of ∆01-comprehension
and Σ01-induction in such a way that a proof of any of the other instances can
be constructed in polynomial time.
Lemma 2.16. The forcing interpretation of WKL0 + RT
2
2 in RCA0 + I given
by Cond, P,  of Definition 2.11 is polynomially ∀Σ02-reflecting.
Proof. Let ϕ := ∃W ∃w ∀y ∃z θ(W,w, y, z) be an ∃Π02 sentence. We sketch a
proof in RCA0 + I that, assuming ϕ, there is a condition s such that s 1
∀W ∀w ∃y ∀z ¬θ. On the basis of the sketch, it will be routine to verify that the
proof can be constructed in polynomial time on input ϕ.
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Let A, k be such that ∀y ∃z θ(A, k, y, z). By Σ01 collection, for each ℓ there
exists m such that ∀y6ℓ ∃z6mθ(A, k, y, z). Use primitive recursion to define a
sequence of numbers by:
k0 := k,
kn+1 := smallest m > kn such that ∀y6kn ∃z6mθ(A, k, y, z).
The axioms of RCA0 imply the existence of the set S = {kn : n ∈ N}, which is
clearly infinite. Use the axiom (I3) of RCA+I to obtain a finite set s ⊆ S which
is a forcing condition. Below, we abuse notation and write A for the finite set
A↾max s.
We claim that s  ∀y ∃z θ(A, k, y, z), which is enough to imply s 1 ∀W ∀w ∃y ∀z ¬θ.
Take s′ P s and ℓ such that s′  ℓ↓. Since s′ ∩ [1, ℓ] is not a condition, s′ \ [1, ℓ]
must be one. Let m1 < m2 be the two smallest elements of s
′ \ [1, ℓ]. By Propo-
sition 2.4(iii), s′ \ [1,m2] is also a condition and (s′ \ [1,m2])  m2↓. It follows
from the definition of s that ∀y6m1 ∃z6m2 θ(A, k, y, z). In particular, there is
some m 6 m2 such that (s
′ \ [1,m2])  m↓ and θ(A, k, ℓ,m). By Lemma 2.14,
we get (s′ \ [1,m2])  θ(A, k, ℓ,m). This implies (s′ \ [1,m2])  ∃z θ(A, k, ℓ, z),
which is what we wanted.
Proof of Lemma 2.10. The statement of the Lemma follows directly from Lemma
2.15, Lemma 2.16, and Theorem 1.17.
Proof of Theorem 2.1. By Lemma 2.10 there is a polynomial-time procedure
which, given a WKL0+RT
2
2 proof π of a ∀Σ
0
2 sentence ψ, outputs an RCA0+ I
proof π′ of ψ. By Lemma 2.9, a further polynomial-time procedure outputs a
proof π′′ of ψ in RCA0 + IΣ
0
2 and a proof π
′′′ of ψ in RCA0 + ¬IΣ02. Combine
π′′, π′′′, and a case distinction to obtain a proof of ψ in RCA0.
3 Ramsey for pairs: speedup over RCA∗0
We will now prove that Theorem 2.1 breaks down completely in the absence of
Σ01 induction, that is, if the base theory RCA0 is replaced by RCA
∗
0, although
WKL∗0 +RT
2
2 is also ∀Σ
0
2-conservative over RCA
∗
0 [30],
Theorem 3.1. RT22 has non-elementary speed-up over RCA
∗
0 with respect to
Σ1 sentences.
We note that the speedup of RT22 over RCA
∗
0 can in fact be witnessed by
∆0(exp) sentences, though the proof involves a slightly larger amount of back-
ground than for the Σ01 case. The idea of the argument is explained in the
remark after the proof of Theorem 3.1.
The basic reason why Theorem 3.1 holds is expressed in the following lemma.
Once the lemma is proved, the upper and lower bounds used to derive the
theorem are obtained by more or less standard techniques described e.g. in the
survey [25].
Lemma 3.2. RCA∗0+RT
2
2 proves the following statement: “for every k, if each
infinite set has a finite subset with k elements, then each infinite set has a finite
subset with 2k elements”.
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Proof. Clearly, it is enough to prove the statement with 2k/2 substituted for 2k.
Working in RCA∗0 + RT
2
2, let k be such that the infinite set A does not have a
subset with 2k/2 elements. W.l.o.g., we may assume that 0 ∈ A. We will use
the fact that there is a 2-colouring of [2k/2]2 with no homogeneous set of size
k, which has a well-known probabilistic proof that easily formalizes in RCA∗0,
to define a 2-colouring of [N]2 such that every infinite homogeneous sets for the
new colouring fails to have a k-element subset.
So, let f : [2k/2]2 → 2 have no homogeneous set of size k. Let {ai : i ∈ I},
for some cut I, be an increasing enumeration of A. Note that 2k/2 > I. Define
g : [N]2 → 2 as follows:
g(x, y) =
{
b if there are i < j s.t. x ∈ [ai, ai+1), y ∈ [aj , aj+1), f(i, j) = b,
0 if there is i s.t. x, y ∈ [ai, ai+1).
Let H be an infinite g-homogeneous set. By possibly thinning out H , we
may assume w.l.o.g. that for each i ∈ I, there is at most one x ∈ H ∩ [ai, ai+1).
This means that for any two x, y ∈ H , the value g(x, y) is determined by the
first clause of the definition of g.
Let x1, . . . , xℓ be the first ℓ elements of H , and let i1, . . . , iℓ be such that
xj ∈ [aij , aij+1). By our choice of H and the definition of g, we see that
f(ij, ij′) = g(xj , xj′ ), so the set {i1, . . . , iℓ} is homogeneous for f . So ℓ < k by
our choice of f .
Consider the simple variant of the iterated exponential function defined by
20 = 1 and 2n+1 = 2
2n for n ∈ N. To prove Theorem 3.1, we will make use
of a family of sentences stating the existence of 222n , for n a natural number.
The relation y = 2x has a ∆0 definition which is well-behaved in I∆0 – see [11,
§3.1], or see [17, Chapt. V.3(c)] for a similar idea applied to the more difficult
case of y = 2x). Thus, ∃y (y = 222n ) can be expressed as a Σ1 sentence of size
O(log n), for instance, by substituting the numeral for n into the fixed formula
∃y (y = 222x ).
Lemma 3.3. In RCA∗0 + RT
2
2, the sentence ∃y (y = 222n ) has a proof of size
polynomial in n.
Proof. Consider the definable set
I = {k : every infinite set has a finite subset with 2k elements}.
In the absence of Σ01 induction, this is a proper initial segment of N and, in
general, not a set (i.e. a second-order object). However, Lemma 3.2 implies that
I is a definable cut provably in RCA∗0 +RT
2
2.
Consider also the set
A = {ℓ : ∃k (ℓ = 2k)}.
Provably in RCA∗0, this is indeed a set, because the ∃k quantifier can be bounded
by ℓ. By the totality of the exponential function, A is infinite. Moreover, since
k 7→ 2k is an increasing monotone operation with a ∆0-definable graph, A has
a subset with k elements exactly for those k for which 2k exists. It follows that
for each k, if I(k), then 22k exists.
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Now fix a natural number n. By [25, Theorem 3.4.1], there are formulas
I0, I1, . . . , In such that I0 is I and for each j < n, the theory RCA
∗
0 + RT
2
2
has a poly(n)-size proof that Ij+1 is a cut and that ∀k (Ij+1(k) → Ij(2
k)). By
putting these proofs together, we get a poly(n)-size proof of I(2n) and hence of
the statement that 222n exists.
Lemma 3.4. The size of the smallest RCA∗0 proof of ∃y (y = 222n ) grows faster
than any elementary recursive function of n.
Proof. In view of Theorem 4.6 in the next section, it suffices to show that the
size of the shortest I∆0 + exp proof of ∃y (y = 222n ) grows nonelementarily in
n. To this end, it is clearly enough to show the existence of a polynomial p such
that, if the sentence ∃z ϕ(z) for a bounded formula ϕ has a proof in I∆0 + exp
of size n, then ∃z622p(n) ϕ(z) holds in ω.
So, assume that I∆0 + exp has a size-n proof of ∃z ϕ(z) for ϕ bounded. We
may assume that I∆0+exp is finitely axiomatized, because it has a finite axiom-
atization that polynomially simulates the more usual one in which ∆0 induction
is a scheme. By standard upper bounds on the cut elimination procedure and
its connection to Herbrand’s theorem [25, Section 5], there is a fixed polynomial
p such that some Herbrand disjunction for ¬(I∆0 + exp) ∨ ∃z ϕ(z) of size at
most 2p(n) is logically valid.
In more detail, what this means is as follows. Consider the conjunction of:
• ∀v1 . . . ∀vk δ(v1, . . . , vk), a statement that induction holds for finitely many
fixed ∆0 formulas with parameters among the v¯; we may assume w.l.o.g.
that all the quantifiers in δ are bounded by one of the vi,
• ∀x∃y (y = 2x), with y = 2x a ∆0 formula in the language of first-order
arithmetic,
• ∀z ¬ϕ(z).
Put this conjunction in prenex normal form and skolemize it, obtaining the
sentence ∀v¯ ∀x∀z ∀w¯ ξ(v¯, x, z, w¯), where the ∀w¯ quantifiers are bounded and ξ
is quantifier-free (but contains the Skolem function symbols corresponding to
the original existential quantifiers). Then, for some s, there is a list of closed
terms
tv1,1, . . . , tvk,1, tx,1, tz,1, tw1,1, . . . , twℓ,1, . . . , tv1,s, . . . , tvk,s, tx,s, tz,s, tw1,s, . . . , twℓ,s
(of the arithmetical language extended by the Skolem functions) such that the
conjunction
Ξ :=
s∧
i=1
ξ(tv¯,i, tx,i, tz,i, tw¯,i)
has size at most 2p(n) and is unsatisfiable.
We now interpret the function symbols appearing in Ξ as operations on
ω. The symbols +, ·, 0, 1 are interpreted in the usual way. If f(. . . , x, . . .) is
the Skolem function symbol corresponding to the ∃y quantifier (f may have
more arguments as a result of the move to prenex normal form), then we put
f(. . . ,m, . . .) = 2m. If f is the Skolem function symbol corresponding to a
bounded existential quantifier ∃u in front of a subformula ψ of δ, ¬ϕ, or y = 2x,
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we let f pick out the smallest witness to ∃uψ on those arguments for which
there is such a witness; otherwise, f returns 0.
Since each function interpreting a symbol in Ξ increases its arguments at
most exponentially, and Ξ has size at most 2p(n), it follows that under our inter-
pretation each term in Ξ has a value bounded by 22p(n) . Since we interpreted the
Skolem function symbols as actual Skolem functions, and I∆0+exp is a true the-
ory, each substitution instance of the skolemizations of ∀v1 . . . ∀vk δ(v1, . . . , vk)
and ∀x∃y (y = 2x) appearing in Ξ is true under our interpretation. However, Ξ
is unsatisfiable, which implies that some substitution instance of the skolemiza-
tion of ∀z ¬ϕ(z) must be false. Due to the way we defined our interpretation,
this means that ∃z622p(n) ϕ(z) holds.
Proof of Theorem 3.1. Immediate from Lemmas 3.3 and 3.4.
Remark. As already mentioned, it is possible to witness the speedup of RCA∗0+
RT22 over RCA
∗
0 by a family of ∆0(exp) sentences. The sentences in question take
the form Con2n(I∆0+exp), where Conx(T ) is a formula stating in a natural way
that there is no proof of contradiction in the theory T of size at most x. Clearly,
Con2n(I∆0 + exp) can be expressed by a ∆0(exp) sentence of size polynomial
in n.
The so-called finitistic Go¨del theorem, proved independently by Friedman
and Pudla´k (see [25, Theorem 6.3.2] and the references therein), implies that
for a sufficiently strong finitely axiomatized T , the size of the smallest proof
of Conn(T ) in T is n
Ω(1). As a consequence, the size of the smallest proof of
Con2n(I∆0 + exp) in I∆0 + exp is (2n)
Ω(1). By Theorem 4.6, a proof of this
sentence in RCA∗0 also requires size (2n)
Ω(1).
On the other hand, essentially by formalizing the proof of Lemma 3.4 but
with ∀z ¬ϕ(z) replaced by 0 = 0, one can prove in I∆0 + exp that, for a cer-
tain fixed polynomial p, the existence of 22p(x) implies Conx(I∆0 + exp). By
Lemma 3.3, RCA∗0 + RT
2
2 can prove the existence of 222p(n) , a number greater
than 22p(2n) , in size poly(n). Thus, it can also prove Con2n(I∆0 + exp) in size
poly(n).
4 Induction versus collection
Since RT22 proves the collection principle BΣ2, Corollary 2.2 implies that IΣ1
polynomially simulates BΣ2 w.r.t. proofs of Π3 sentences. In this context, it
is natural to ask whether the Πn+2-conservativity of BΣn+1 over IΣn is also
witnessed by a polynomial simulation for n 6= 1. A related problem was raised by
Clote et al. [8, page 216]: is the conservativity provable in bounded arithmetic?
Note that if a Π2 sentence of the form ∀x∃y δ(x, y), such as a conservativity
statement, is provable in bounded arithmetic, then the least witness for the ∃y
quantifier can be bounded by a polynomial-time function of x.
In this section, we present, for each n ∈ N, a polynomial forcing interpre-
tation τ(n) of BΣn+1 + exp in IΣn + exp that is polynomially Πn+2-reflecting.
The existence of these forcing interpretations, of course, implies that IΣn poly-
nomially simulates BΣn+1 w.r.t. Πn+2 sentences whenever n > 1; for n = 0, we
get a polynomial simulation of BΣ1 + exp by I∆0 + exp. Our interpretations
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can be formalized in (a fragment of) bounded arithmetic, which partially solves
the problem from [8] as well: completely for n > 1, over exp for n = 0.
The only role of exp is to provide us with the usual universal Σn+1 for-
mula Σn+1-Sat(v, x). Recall that I∆0 + exp proves θ(x¯)↔ Σn+1-Sat(θ, [x¯]) for
θ ∈ Σn+1, as well as the usual recursive conditions for a satisfaction relation
restricted to Σn+1 formulas; cf. [17, Chapts. I.1(d), V.5(b)].
Remark. The question from [8] as stated concerned provability in I∆0 + Ω1,
which coincides with the L1-consequences of Buss’ theory S2. The related Ques-
tion 35 from the Clote-Kraj´ıcˇek list of open questions [10] – whether the stronger
theory I∆0 + exp proves the mere equiconsistency of BΣn+1 and IΣn – was al-
ready answered positively in Ha´jek’s paper [16, Section 2] in the same volume
where the list appeared.
Remark. While we were writing up our paper, we learnt that Fedor Pakhomov
[private communication] independently proved that IΣn polynomially simulates
BΣn+1 w.r.t. Πn+2 (and that bounded arithmetic proves this) by a different
argument that avoids the need for exp in the case n = 0. Moreover, in an email
discussion with us, Pakhomov found a parametric interpretation of BΣn+1 +
exp+¬σ in IΣn+exp+¬σ for each Πn+2 sentence σ, at least for n > 0. It would
be interesting to know whether his interpretation can be made independent
of the Πn+2 sentence in question, and whether the use of parameters can be
avoided.
The model-theoretic idea behind our forcing interpretations is simple and
appeared already in [8, Lemma 12]: given M |= IΣn + exp, if we construct a
non-cofinal K <Σn+1 M , then M 4Σn+1 supK M |= BΣn+1 + exp. If the aim
is only to show the Πn+2-conservativity of BΣn+1 + exp over IΣn + exp, one
can build the extension K by any method, but to get a forcing interpretation
a forcing construction is needed. The forcing construction we choose is that of
a generic Σn+1 ultrapower [22, pages 181f.]; cf. the proof of Theorem B in [23].
In particular, the construction employs an ultrafilter U on the Boolean algebra
generated by the Σn+1-definable subsets of M . Elements of the ultrapower K
are represented by Σn+1-definable partial functions M ⇀ M whose domain is
an element of U . To ensure that the ultrapower is a non-cofinal extension, we
require every element of U to be cofinal in M . It would be possible to first
define a forcing relation ′τ(n) for the ultrapower K and then define a second
forcing relation τ(n) for the truncation supK M in terms of 
′
τ(n). To save
some notation, we introduce the second one directly.
An alternative forcing interpretation, much closer in spirit to the one used
to prove Theorem 2.1 and therefore perhaps easier to follow for the reader
acquainted with Section 2, is mentioned in a remark after the proof of Theorem
4.3. However, that interpretation only works for n > 0.
In the remainder of this section, ∃∞x (“for infinitely many x” or “for cofinally
many x”) stands for ∀y ∃x>y and ∀∞x (“for almost all x”) stands for ∃y ∀x>y.
Definition 4.1. Let n ∈ N. Define a forcing translation τ(n) from the language
of first-order arithmetic to itself as follows.
Letting x ∈ Extn+1(s) stand for Σn+1-Sat(s, [x]), a Σn+1 formula s will be
in Condτ(n) if ∃
∞x (x ∈ Extn+1(s)). For two conditions s, s′, we let s′ Pτ(n) s
if Extn+1(s
′) ⊆ Extn+1(s).
23
Names are also Σn+1 formulas. For a condition s and name v, we say that
s τ(n) v↓ if
∀∞x∈Extn+1(s) ∃!yΣn+1-Sat(v, [x, y])
∧ ∃d ∀∞x∈Extn+1(s)∃y6dΣn+1-Sat(v, [x, y]).
For a simple atomic formula α(v1, . . . , vℓ), we say that s τ(n) α(v¯) if s τ(n) v¯↓
and
∀∞x∈Extn+1(s)∃y1, y2, . . . , yℓ
( ℓ∧
i=1
Σn+1-Sat(vi, [x, yi]) ∧ α(y¯)
)
.
When there is no risk of ambiguity, we will often omit the subscript τ(n).
In other words, conditions are infinite Σn+1-definable sets and names are
(to be viewed as) Σn+1-definable partial functions. A condition s forces v↓ if v
has a unique value on almost all elements of s and if there is a common upper
bound on almost all of those values.
It is known that Σn+1 ultrapowers of models of IΣn satisfy  Los´’s Theorem
for Σn+1 and Πn+1 formulas [22, Lemma 5.13]. This ensures Σn+2-elementarity
between the base modelM and the ultrapowerK, although, as remarked earlier,
Σn+1-elementarity is already enough to run our argument
1. We transform these
ideas into a syntactic proof in the following.
Proposition 4.2. There is a polynomial-time procedure which, given n ∈ N in
unary and a formula θ(y1, y2, . . . , yℓ) in Σn ∪ Πn, outputs a proof of
∀s∈Condτ(n) ∀v1, v2, . . . , vℓ

“s τ(n) θ(v¯)”
↔ “s τ(n) v¯↓” ∧ ∀
∞x∈Extn+1(s) ∃y¯
( ℓ∧
i=1
Σn+1-Sat(vi, [x, yi]) ∧ θ(y¯)
)


in IΣn + exp.
Proof. Just like the usual proof of  Los´’s Theorem for Σn+1 ultrapowers [22,
Lemma 5.13], the construction splits into two steps.
(1) For ∆0 formulas θ, we build the required proof by induction on the struc-
ture of θ.
(2) Beyond that, we build the proof using induction on the number of un-
bounded quantifier blocks in θ.
Of course, the step for a single quantifier block in (2) itself splits into smaller
steps corresponding to individual quantifiers.
In the remainder of the argument, we think of n ∈ N as fixed. We leave
it to the reader to verify that the proofs in IΣn + exp described below can be
found in time polynomial in the given parameters. The polynomial dependence
on n rather than just on |θ| cannot be avoided: it comes for instance from the
1To get the required amount of elementarity, we follow Enayat–Mohsenipour [13, Theo-
rem 2.1] instead of Clote et al. [8, Lemma 11].
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universal Σn+1 formula, which is already used in the definition of Extn+1, and
thus of Condτ(n) and τ(n).
In the construction for (1), the base step is for an atomic formula θ(v¯).If θ is
simple atomic, the required equivalence follows immediately from the definition
of τ(n). For a non-simple atomic θ, the argument is similar to the one in Lemma
2.14. By induction on the structure of a term t(u¯) (u¯ a subtuple of v¯) appearing
in θ, we build a proof that, for an appropriate fresh name w, s  t[w] if and only
if the following happens: s  u¯↓, s  w↓, and for almost all x ∈ Extn+1(s) the
values y¯, z of u¯, w at x exist and satisfy t(y¯) = z. Once this is proved for each
term in θ, the required equivalence is proved using (FT7)Item.7, (FT6)Item.6,
and the definition of τ(n).
The inductive steps of the construction for (1) are more or less based on the
usual proof of  Los´’s Theorem with the satisfaction relation for the ultrapower
replaced by the forcing relation. As a demonstration, we show the case for
negation.
Suppose θ is ¬η for η ∈ ∆0. The inductive assumption gives us a proof
that if s and v¯ are such that s  v¯↓, then s  η(v¯) exactly if for almost all
x ∈ Extn+1(s) the values of the vi’s at x exist and satisfy η.
Take any s ∈ Cond and any e¯ such that s  e¯↓. If s 1 ¬η(e¯), then
(FT5)Item.5 gives us s′ P s such that s′  η(e¯), and so, by the proof from
the induction hypothesis,
∀∞x∈Extn+1(s
′)∃y¯
( ℓ∧
i=1
Σn+1-Sat(ei, [x, yi]) ∧ η(y¯)
)
,
hence also
∃∞x∈Extn+1(s)∃y¯
( ℓ∧
i=1
Σn+1-Sat(ei, [x, yi]) ∧ η(y¯)
)
.
Conversely, suppose s  ¬η(e¯). By (FT5)Item.5 and the proof from the induc-
tion hypothesis,
∀s′Ps ∃∞x∈Extn+1(s
′) ∀y¯
( ℓ∧
i=1
Σn+1-Sat(ei, [x, yi])→ ¬η(y¯)
)
.
Since the conjunction of the formula s with ∃y¯
(∧∧ℓ
i=1 Σn+1-Sat(ei, [x, yi]) ∧ η(y¯)
)
is equivalent to some Σn+1 formula s
′, this implies
¬∃∞x∈Extn+1(s)∃y¯
( ℓ∧
i=1
Σn+1-Sat(ei, [x, yi]) ∧ η(y¯)
)
,
so, given that s  e¯↓,
∀∞x∈Extn+1(s) ∃y¯
( ℓ∧
i=1
Σn+1-Sat(ei, [x, yi]) ∧ ¬η(y¯)
)
,
If n = 0, then (1) already suffices. So suppose n > 0. In the construction
for (2), we also imitate the usual proof of  Los´’s Theorem, but additionally we
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need to take care of the fact that our anticipated ultrapower is truncated. The
bounds involved will be provided by strong Σn collection, which is the principle
that given a Σn formula ϕ(x, y) and a bound a, there is a bound b such that
for all x < a, if any y satisfying ϕ(x, y) exists, then some such y may be found
below b. It is well-known that for n > 0 this is equivalent to IΣn, cf. [17,
Theorem I.2.23(a)]. The only part of (2) that requires special attention is the
→ direction for the universal quantifier.
So, suppose θ is ∀w¯ η(v¯, w¯), where η ∈ Σk and k < n. Work over IΣn + exp.
The inductive assumption gives us a proof that if s, v¯, w¯ are such that s  v¯↓, w¯↓,
then s  η(v¯, w¯) exactly if for almost all x ∈ Extn+1(s) the values of the vi’s
and wj ’s at x exist and satisfy η.
Take any s ∈ Cond and any e¯ such that s  e¯↓. Assume
∃∞x∈Extn+1(s)∀y¯
( ℓ∧
i=1
Σn+1-Sat(ei, [x, yi])→ ¬∀w¯ η(y¯, w¯)
)
.
Let s′ be a canonical Σn+1 formula equivalent to the conjunction of s with
∃y¯
( ℓ∧
i=1
Σn+1-Sat(ei, [x, yi]) ∧ ∃w¯ ¬η(y¯, w¯)
)
.
Then s′ ∈ Cond by assumption. Recall that s  e¯↓. Find d such that
ℓ∧
i=1
∀∞x∈Extn+1(s) ∃y6dΣn+1-Sat(ei, [x, y]).
Suppose w¯ = w1, w2, . . . , wℓ′ where ℓ
′ > 1. For each j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , ℓ′}, find a
canonical Σn+1 formula with free variables x, z that is equivalent to
∃y¯ ∃〈w¯〉
( ℓ∧
i=1
Σn+1-Sat(ei, [x, yi]) ∧ ¬η(y¯, w¯) ∧ ∀〈w¯
′〉<〈w¯〉 η(y¯, w¯′) ∧ z = wj
)
.
Let this Σn+1 formula be (coded by the number) e
′
j . Since IΣk holds, we know∧∧ℓ′
j=1 ∀
∞x∈Extn+1(s′)∃!zΣn+1-Sat(e′j , [x, z]). Use strong Πk collection to ob-
tain d′ such that
∀y¯6d
(
∃〈w¯〉 ¬η(y¯, w¯)→ ∃〈w¯〉6d′ ¬η(y¯, w¯)
)
.
As the reader can verify, this ensures
ℓ′∧
j=1
∀∞x∈Extn+1(s
′) ∃z6d′ Σn+1-Sat(e
′
j , [x, z]).
Thus s′  e¯′↓. If s′′ P s′, then the proof from the induction hypothesis gives us
s′′  ¬η(e¯, e¯′) and so s′′ 1 η(e¯, e¯′) by Lemma 1.10. Hence (FT7)Item.7 tells us
s 1 ∀w¯ η(e¯, w¯).
Remark. For n > 0, the argument in the proof above relies on induction axioms
in two places. Speaking in model-theoretic terms, first we use at most IΣn−1
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to guarantee the existence of sufficiently many Skolem functions when proving
 Los´’s Theorem for the ultrapower K, and then we use strong Σn collection to
pass on the elementarity from K to supK M . For n = 0, the latter application
is not needed (and we do not have strong collection anyway), but we use full
IΣn to get the  Los´ Theorem we want.
In the usual argument proving Πn+1 conservativity of BΣn+1 of IΣn [17,
page 229] it is easy to deduce from the analogue of Proposition 4.2 that the trun-
cated ultrapower supK M is a Σn+1-elementary extension of the base model M .
In the model-theoretic setting, this directly implies supK M |= I∆0. When for-
mulated in terms of forcing interpretations, elementarity becomes reflection, but
being reflecting in the sense of Definition 1.16 is not enough to ensure that every
condition forces I∆0, which is required by (FI13)Item.25. So we strengthen the
notion of reflection in the statement below. From this, one quickly derives exp
using the cofinality of M inside supK M and the I∆0-provable monotonicity of
the exponential function. The model-theoretic idea behind the interpretation
of BΣn+1 is a standard underspill argument used to show that a Σn-elementary
proper initial segment of K |= IΣn satisfies BΣn+1. When n > 0, it is actually
enough to assume K |= IΣn−1 [7, Proposition 3], but we do not need this for
our proof.
Theorem 4.3. For every n ∈ N, the forcing translation τ(n) is a polynomial
forcing interpretation of BΣn+1 + exp in IΣn + exp that is polynomially Πn+2-
reflecting.
In fact the τ(n) are polynomially Πn+2-reflecting in the following strength-
ened and uniform sense: there is a single polynomial-time procedure which,
given n ∈ N in unary and a Πn+2 sentence γ, outputs a proof of
∃s∈Condτ(n) (s τ(n) γ)→ γ
in IΣn + exp.
Proof. As in the proof of Proposition 4.2, we think of n ∈ N as fixed and leave
it to the reader to check that the running time of a procedure constructing the
proofs in IΣn + exp described below can be bounded by a polynomial in n and
|γ|.
Strengthened reflection. Let γ be a Πn+2 sentence of the form ∀u¯ ∃v¯ θ(u¯, v¯),
where θ(u1, u2, . . . , uk, v1, v2, . . . , vℓ) is Πn. Let s be such that s  ∀u¯ ∃v¯ θ(u¯, v¯).
Take any a1, a2, . . . , ak. Then, as one can verify using (FT7)Item.7 and the defi-
nition of τ(n), we have s  ∃v¯ θ(¯ˇa, v¯), where each aˇi is the (code of) the ∆0 for-
mula x = x∧y = ai. From this, we deduce that ∀s′Ps ∃s′′Ps′ ∃v¯
(
s′′  θ(¯ˇa, v¯)
)
.
We then apply Proposition 4.2 to get
∀s′Ps ∃s′′Ps′ ∃v¯ ∀∞x∈Extn+1(s
′′)∃y¯
( ℓ∧
j=1
Σn+1-Sat(vj , [x, yj ]) ∧ θ(a¯, y¯)
)
.
In particular, we know ∃v¯ θ(a¯, v¯) holds.
Interpretation of I∆0+ exp. The I∆0 part follows easily from strengthened
reflection for Σ1 sentences. For exp, simply prove that for any s ∈ Cond and
any e, if s  e↓, then s  e′ = 2e, where e′ is the Σn+1 formula
∃z
(
Σn+1-Sat(e, [x, y]) ∧ y = 2
z
)
.
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Interpretation of BΣn+1. By induction on m 6 n, we construct proofs of
∀s∈Cond (s  BΠm).
This is sufficient by Proposition 1.14 and the well-known equivalence between
BΠn and BΣn+1. Take any m 6 n. In the case when m 6= 0, suppose that
we already have a proof of ∀s∈Cond (s  BΠm−1). Consider a Πm formula
θ(u, v, w). Take e and some s ∈ Cond which forces ∀u6e∃v θ(u, v, e). Then any
element v∗ in the ultrapower K that lies above the truncated part supK M can
be used to bound the ∃v quantifier, i.e.,
∀v∗


∀∞x∈Extn+1(s)∃!yΣn+1-Sat(v
∗, [x, y])
∧ ∀d ∀∞x∈Extn+1(s) ∃y>dΣn+1-Sat(v
∗, [x, y])
→ ∀∞x∈Extn+1(s) ∃y
∗, z(
Σn+1-Sat(v
∗, [x, y∗]) ∧Σn+1-Sat(e, [x, z])
∧ ∀u6z ∃v6y∗ θ(u, v, z)
)


. (6)
To see why this holds formally, first one seeks a -free description of what s 
∀u6e ∃v θ(u, v, e) means, using Proposition 4.2, (FT7)Item.7, (FT6)Item.6, and
basic facts about forcing interpretations from Section 1 (note that we already
know that τ(n) is a polynomial forcing interpretation of some theory, and all
that remains is to verify (FI13)Item.25 for BΣn). Unlike in (6), this leaves the
∀u and the ∃v quantifiers outside the big brackets. To push the ∃v quantifier
inside, use the bound d in the definition of s  v↓. To push the ∀u quantifier
inside, run one step of the proof of  Los´’s Theorem for the ultrapower K. Since
this part is similar to what we did for Proposition 4.2, we leave the details to
the reader.
Feeding, for instance, v∗ equal to px = yq – in other words, the diagonal
element of the ultrapower – into (6), we see that for almost all x ∈ Extn+1(s),
we have some y∗ such that ∀u6z ∃v6y∗ θ(u, v, z), where z is the unique number
satisfying Σn+1-Sat(e, [x, z]). By Σm-induction, we can find the smallest such
y∗, which shows
∀∞x∈Extn+1(s)∃!yΣn+1-Sat(e
′, [x, y]),
where e′ is a canonical Σn+1 formula equivalent over IΣn to
∃z
(
Σn+1-Sat(e, [x, z]) ∧ ∀u6z ∃v6y θ(u, v, z) ∧ ∀y
′<y¬∀u6z ∃v6y′ θ(u, v, z)
)
.
In view of (FT5)Item.5 and (FT7)Item.7, it suffices to find s′ P s which satisfies
∃d ∀∞x∈Extn+1(s
′)∃y6dΣn+1-Sat(e
′, [x, y]),
because this will imply s′  e′↓ and thus s′  ∀u6e∃v6e′ θ(u, v, e) by Proposi-
tion 4.2. Note that Proposition 4.2 applies only to Σn or Πn formulas, but we
can treat ∀u6z ∃v6y θ(u, v, z) as a Πm formula even when m > 1, thanks to
Proposition 1.14 and the induction hypothesis that s  BΠm−1.
We obtain the requisite d by an underspill argument formalized using (6). If
there are infinitely many x ∈ Extn+1(s) such that Σn+1-Sat(e
′, [x, 0]), then we
are easily done. So suppose not. Let e′′ be the Σn+1 formula
Σn+1-Sat(e
′, [x, y + 1]).
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Then by our supposition and the fact that ∀∞x∈Extn+1(s)∃!yΣn+1-Sat(e′, [x, y]),
we have
∀∞x∈Extn+1(s) ∃!yΣn+1-Sat(e
′′, [x, y]).
Moreover, the minimality condition in the formula e′ implies
∀∞x∈Extn+1(s) ∀y, z(
Σn+1-Sat(e
′′, [x, y]) ∧ Σn+1-Sat(e, [x, z])→ ¬∀u6z ∃v6y θ(u, v, z)
)
.
So, by (6) applied to v∗ ..= e′′, there must be a d such that for infinitely many
x ∈ Extn+1(s) we have ∀y>d¬Σn+1-Sat(e′′, [x, y]). Unravelling the definitions,
this tells us
∃d ∃∞x∈Extn+1(s)∀y>d¬Σn+1-Sat(e
′, [x, y]).
Fix such d. Since ∀∞x∈Extn+1(s)∃yΣn+1-Sat(e′, [x, y]), we know
s′ P s ∧ ∀∞x∈Extn+1(s
′) ∃y6dΣn+1-Sat(e
′, [x, y]),
where s′ is some canonical Σn+1 formula equivalent to
x ∈ Extn+1(s) ∧ ∃y6dΣn+1-Sat(e
′, [x, y]).
Remark. For n > 0, there is an alternative polynomially Πn+2-reflecting forcing
interpretation based on a generic cut construction similar to the one from Section
2. We work in a version IΣn + (I) in which the axiom (I3) is changed to “every
infinite Σn−1-definable set contains an ω
x-large subset for some x > I. (The
axioms (I1)–(I3) can then be eliminated by some variant of Lemma 2.9 as in
Section 2). The role of infinite sets is now played by infinite Σn−1-definable
sets. The forcing conditions are finite sets s (which now include e.g. all bounded
∆n-definable sets) that are ω
x-large for some x > I and, for n > 2, have the
property that if ℓ1 < ℓ2 are elements of s, then the Skolem function for the first
∃ quantifier of the Σn−1 universal formula takes values below ℓ2 on inputs below
ℓ1. The rest of the argument is along the lines of Section 2, except that the step
for RT22 in the proof of Lemma 2.15 is replaced by the considerably easier step
for the infinite ∆0 pigeonhole principle (a.k.a. BΣ2) relative to 0
(n−1).
In an analogue of this argument for n = 0, the conditions would be finite
sets with more than I elements that are at least exponentially far apart from
each other. However, the proof of Lemma 2.16 (reflection) no longer works.
The proof of the reflection lemma makes use of the fact that for any element k
there is a condition s such that min s > k. But in a model of I∆0 + exp there
might be an element above which the exponential function may be iterated only
a standard (a fortiori, no greater than I) number of times.
For each fixed n ∈ N, the proof of Theorem 4.3 can be formalized in the
theory PV, a fragment of bounded arithmetic corresponding to polynomial-
time computation. As already mentioned, this provides a solution to a problem
of Clote et al. [8] for n > 1 and a partial solution for n = 0.
Corollary 4.4. For each n ∈ N, the theory IΣn + exp polynomially simulates
BΣn+1+exp with respect to Πn+2 sentences. Moreover, the Πn+2-conservativity
of BΣn+1 + exp over IΣn + exp is provable in PV.
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Proof. The first part follows directly from Theorem 4.3 and Theorem 1.17. The
second part is obtained by formalizing the proof of Theorem 4.3 for a fixed
n ∈ N in PV.
In fact, the proof of Theorem 4.3 is witnessed by a single polynomial-time
algorithm that takes n (in unary) as input, and this algorithm can also be
formalized in PV. As a result, we can conclude that the Πn+2-conservativity
of BΣn+1 + exp over IΣn + exp holds provably in PV for any n for which the
axioms of BΣn+1 + exp over IΣn + exp actually exist as finite strings – that is,
for any n in the definable cut Log, the domain of the exponential function.
Corollary 4.5. PV proves that for every n ∈ Log, the theory BΣn+1 + exp is
Πn+2-conservative over IΣn + exp.
As the reader may have noticed, one can actually extract from the truncated
generic ultrapower construction (alternatively, from the generic cut construction
for n > 0) a forcing interpretation of WKL∗0 + BΣ
0
n+1 in IΣn + exp that is
polynomially Πn+2-reflecting. In fact, one can interpret more, as the following
theorem shows.
Theorem 4.6. For each n ∈ N, the theory IΣn + exp polynomially simulates
WKL∗0 + BΣ
0
n+1 with respect to Πn+2 sentences.
Proof. First, notice there exists a polynomial forcing interpretation of WKL∗0+
BΣ0n+1 in BΣn+1 + exp that polynomially reflects L1 sentences. For n > 1,
this follows from Theorem 3.13(a) in Ha´jek [16]. If n = 0, then such a forcing
interpretation can be extracted from Sections 5–8 in Avigad [1]. Then compose
with τ(n) and invoke Theorem 1.17.
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